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Governing by Numbers - Key Indicators and the 
Politics of Expectations. An Introduction 
Walter Bartl, Christian Papilloud  
& Audrey Terracher-Lipinski ∗ 
Abstract: »Regieren durch Zahlen – Schlüsselindikatoren und Erwartungspolitik. 
Eine Einführung«. In this special issue of Historical Social Research, indicators 
are considered epistemic devices that render the world governable by quantifi-
cation. While endowed with an aura of objectivity, indicators are not neutral 
devices. Instead they transform the world they claim to describe. Against the 
backdrop of a global proliferation of indicators, we argue in favour of research 
that strategically focuses on the processes that lead to the institutionalisation 
and systematic use of key indicators in politics compared to cases in which 
these processes fail. This type of research strategy could enhance the accumu-
lation of systematic knowledge as well as the relevance of social studies of 
quantification. Furthermore, we propose a heuristic for analysing how indica-
tors are involved in shaping imaginations of the future following the three dis-
tinct dimensions of meaning (factual, social, temporal) as introduced by Luh-
mann. We also review diachronic and synchronic approaches to analysing the 
genesis and use of indicators in order to derive testable hypotheses about the 
gap between indicator design and policy use. Finally, we introduce the articles 
of this special issue. 
Keywords: Quantification, key indicators, politics of expectations, genesis and 
use of indicators. 
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1.  The Growing Relevance of Indicators 
In recent decades the world has seen a considerable increase in the number of 
indicators in use. The rising relevance of indicators has been attributed to vari-
ous developments that are partially connected to each other. First, growing 
complexity in an ever-more globalised world has nurtured demand for orientat-
ing and readily accessible knowledge (Rottenburg and Merry 2015; Mau 2017). 
Since numbers are said to possess crucial features that cater to this demand, 
quantification has become a pervasive feature of contemporary society. Sec-
ond, the idea of output measurement and control began materialising in the 
1980s, especially in the political sphere and in publicly funded organisations, in 
an attempt by state organisations to gain legitimacy for public action primarily 
through numbers. These policies, inspired by the discourse of New Public 
Management, strive to hold accountable through quantification the addressees 
of public regulation as well as the regulative public bodies and public service 
providers themselves (Power 2002). Based on a distinction developed by Fritz 
Scharpf, one could say that the use of performance indicators strives to demon-
strate the effectiveness of policies for the people (creating output legitimacy) – 
in contrast to policies by the people (based on input legitimacy) (Scharpf 1999, 
16-28). Beyond the state, civil society actors attempt to substantiate their polit-
ical claims and mobilise support by referring to quantitative evidence (Bradley 
2015; Urueña). Third, on the supply side of indicator production, these de-
mands have been met with methodological innovations and the increasing 
technological capacities of quantification. Social research has brought about 
new methods of measurement (Land, Michalos, and Sirgy 2012; Malito, Um-
bach, and Bhuta 2018; Mungiu-Pippidi 2016), and improvements in infor-
mation infrastructure – both analogue and digital – have facilitated the supply 
of numbers for public and private governance purposes (Anheier 2018; König, 
Schröder, and Wiegand 2018).1  
This proliferation of indicators has not been free of controversy (Rottenburg 
et al. 2015). While underlining their potential instrumental value with respect 
to the coordination of actions and collective decision making, critics have 
warned about their naïve use, for example in politics, as well as about the dif-
ferent methodological issues attached to their production (Mayntz 2017). 
Measurement ambiguities create the potential for cultural repertoires of inter-
pretation and particular interests to confound the validity of indicators by influ-
encing the definition of categories as well as the selection of indicators and 
their aggregation to composite measures. Other critics regard indicators as an 
expression of a neoliberal form of governance that ultimately hollows out truly 
democratic deliberation (Brown 2015; Supiot 2017). They support the more 
                                                             
1  See also the contribution of Rainer Diaz-Bone (2019) in this special issue of HSR. 
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general idea that indicators are not neutral measurement tools because they are 
rooted in mathematics and statistics. Instead they shape the social world by 
defining expectations through their methodological principles as well as their 
social and technological production processes. This is the main argument de-
veloped in this special issue on governing by numbers. Let us begin with the 
basics: what are indicators? 
2. Indicators and Key Indicators 
An indicator signals empirical information about the static or dynamic proper-
ties of an object (Porter 2015). An often-cited definition of indicators states that 
“desirable indicators are those that summarize or otherwise simplify relevant 
information, make visible or perceptible phenomena of interest, and quantify, 
measure, and communicate relevant information” (Gallopín 1996, 108). While 
this definition might not be entirely consensual, it underlines four key features 
that are typically associated with the indicators we are going to discuss in this 
section: First, indicators are a form of quantification; second, the information 
provided is the result of a reduction in complexity; third, indicators make phe-
nomena visible that might not otherwise be directly observable; fourth, it is 
probably not a coincidence that the definition emphasises the relevance of both 
the phenomena of interest as well as the communicated numerical result. Let us 
look in detail at the four features typically ascribed to indicators, beginning 
with quantification. 
Etymologically, the words indicator and index mean pointing; logically in-
dicators point, detect or measure, but do not explain (Porter 2015, 34). Hence, 
words or icons could be conceptualised as indicators, but usually the notion 
refers to a form of quantification. Quantification is the process of producing 
and communicating numbers that claim to represent part of the world (Es-
peland and Stevens 2008).2 Quantification allows things that formerly went 
unnoticed or that were expressed in words, to be represented by numbers. This 
gives these phenomena an aura of objectivity (Porter 1995). It is important to 
pay heed to different scales of measurement because they depict the relation-
ship between the numeric sign and its referent in a particular way. For our 
purposes it is enough to distinguish between a nominal, an ordinal, and a metric 
level of measurement. In its most simple form, an indicator determines the 
equality or inequality of phenomena, which has been considered as a measure-
ment on a nominal scale (Stevens 1946). The position that a nominal measure-
ment, as defined by Stevens, constitutes a form of measurement at all has been 
                                                             
2  Reference to an external referent is what distinguishes numbers from the formulae of 
mathematics. Mathematics constitutes a self-referential system of signs in which only in-
ternal consistency counts (Heintz 2007). 
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sharply disputed (Duncan 1984, 122-27). However, we think it is still useful to 
regard the nominal scale as a form of measurement since it is a formalised form 
of classification that depends on a prior definition of categories and coding 
rules and which very often leads to quantification through counting on an ag-
gregate level (Stevens 1946). Ordinal measurement translates a verbal formula-
tion of “more” or “less” of a particular dimension into numbers, allowing units 
of analysis to be ranked but without determining the exact distance between the 
measured values. On a metric scale it is also possible to determine the equality 
of intervals between values (interval scale) or the equality of ratios. The result-
ing numbers can be further transformed depending on the scale of measure-
ment. Stevens summarised his notion of measurement by requiring there be at 
least a “consistent set of rules” for the assignment of numerals (Stevens 1946, 
680). In a similar vein, Alain Desrosières states that quantification  
entails, firstly, agreement, that is deciding on the conventions, choice of ob-
jects and modes of equivalence and then, once these conventions have been 
finalised, proceeding with the measurement operations proper (Desrosières 
2016, 184).  
Hence, we suggest that indicators be regarded as the result of a process of 
assigning numerals to units of analysis based on a consistent set of rules.  
Processes of quantification reduce complexity in at least two ways. First, the 
decisions taken in operationalising a variable reduce the plurality of meanings 
and valuations to a single number.3 It is precisely the polysemy of language 
that can be overcome by quantification. Second, numbers can be further trans-
formed, e.g. single indicators can be integrated into more abstract composite 
indexes. While the construction of composite indexes can generate particular 
methodological problems (Hagerty and Land 2012; Grupp and Mogee 2004), 
we would like to highlight the reduction in complexity that these transforma-
tive steps perform. When designing indicators, it should be noted that the more 
transformations an indicator undergoes during its production process, the less 
intuitive its interpretation will be to potential users. The seeming transparency 
of composite measures from the designer’s point of view may give the impres-
sion of arbitrariness among policy-makers (Sébastien and Bauler 2013, 7). 
From a practical perspective, policy indicators should have a clear and accepted 
normative interpretation and be intuitively valid to the public (Atkinson et al. 
2002, 21-24). An alternative strategy of capturing the multidimensionality of a 
problem is the compilation of a portfolio of indicators instead of creating com-
posite indexes which might be difficult to interpret (Atkinson et al. 2002, 24-5). 
Important principles of this strategy are that the chosen indicators be balanced 
across different dimensions of the problem and not differ grossly in their 
weighting. In addition, the multidimensionality of a problem is more likely to 
                                                             
3  See also the article by Thévenot (2019) in this special issue of HSR. 
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be expressed by indicators if they are developed as part of a participatory ap-
proach (Atkinson et al. 2002; Salais 2008; Eyraud 2017). 
Furthermore, the definition of an indicator as cited above alludes to the fact 
that indicators make particular phenomena visible which have hitherto gone 
unnoticed or could not be directly observed (c.f. Porter 2015; Brighenti 2017). 
Again, there are at least two different possible readings with respect to this. 
First, when it comes to an indicator’s validity, the observability of the features 
of the phenomena under consideration is a relevant aspect of the quantification 
process. While directly observable features are amenable to counting, features 
that are not directly observable require some form of measurement.4 In contrast 
to counting, measurement implies “descriptive inference – using observations 
from the world to learn about other unobserved facts” (King, Keohane, and 
Verba 1994, 8; Mayntz 2017). Hence, otherwise latent phenomena become 
manifest by their operationalisation and description through certain indicators. 
In these cases, indicators use a limited set of observable parameters to measure 
phenomena that are not directly observable on their own. For example, the 
American census created racial categories that ultimately came to represent 
heterogeneous populations as homogeneous social groups (Mora 2014; Okamo-
to and Mora 2014). When indicators are based on indirect measurement rather 
than direct observation, questions of validity become especially salient. Indica-
tors used in politics basically face the same problem as those used in science, 
but political indicators are very often treated with a sense of naïve realism 
(Desrosières 2007, 10; Mayntz 2017). The preconditions of quantification – 
categorisation, establishment of commensurability, and measurement – are not 
reflected as long as no doubt or critique about the validity of the measurement 
is voiced (Heintz 2007, 75). Second, beyond representational questions of 
validity, strong constructivist arguments claim that tools of statistical observa-
tion and calculation enact or demonstrate social reality (Osborne and Rose 
1999; Law and Urry 2004; Callon 2007; MacKenzie and Millo 2003; critical: 
Didier 2007; Sparsam 2019). A weaker form of the performativity argument 
claims that quantification transforms pre-existing phenomena by making them 
more visible: While an agricultural survey quantifying “pickles” does not cre-
ate the agricultural product in question, at least it makes it visible as an epis-
temic object to a superregional audience (Didier 2007). That said, while indica-
tors are often conceptualised as measuring latent phenomena, we would like to 
suggest that the concept of indicators should not be restricted to only such 
cases. Instead, by including quantification processes that are based on direct 
observation and simple counting procedures, phenomena that had previously 
gone unnoticed are made visible to a wider audience. This broader concept 
                                                             
4  Lazarsfeld and Menzel ([1956] 1993) referred to the former as individual and the latter as 
structural or global properties of social collectives (Mayntz 2017, 4). 
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enables the effect of the quantification process on the use of indicators to be 
systematically analysed.  
Numbers, statistics, and indicators are often used interchangeably although 
there are significant analytical differences between these concepts. Numbers 
are numerical signs that refer to an external referent and can be used for math-
ematical calculations. The science of mathematics establishes calculation rules 
and functions entirely without external referents (Heintz 2007, 66). Statistics, 
i.e. the results of data gathering, are different from mere numbers since in a 
statistic, numbers are compiled and formatted in a way that eases their commu-
nication and analysis in order to be indicative. Early examples of data gathering 
about “the state” only occasionally resulted in quantification and only later in a 
format that we consider today to be a statistic (such as a chart or a graph dis-
playing systematically selected units).5 The distinction between (official) statis-
tics and indicators has been a recurring theme in the literature on social and 
environmental indicators, with (official) statistics often being portrayed inaccu-
rately as “raw data” and indicators referring to an analytical or normative con-
cept (Horn 1978; Gudmundsson 2003, 4). In fact, no piece of data can speak 
for itself (Vollmer 2018). We argue, though, that too sharp a distinction be-
tween statistics and indicators is likely to conceal implicit concepts underlying 
statistics, while those statistics might nevertheless be of crucial importance for 
the practices in a given social field. When concepts remain relatively implicit, 
we consider reconstructing and explicating the pragmatically relevant concepts 
to be an analytical task. When indicators are not published in an isolated form 
but are instead grouped as a set of indicators or even as part of an integrated 
system of indicators (Noll 2014), the grouping itself provides an indication of 
the underlying concept.  
Reiterating the fourth aspect of the definition of an indicator quoted above 
we will now discuss the relevance of indicators. How constitutive is it to con-
ceive indicators as relevant? With regard to the supply side, it is evident that 
the production of indicators requires a substantial investment of time, money 
and epistemic work. Hence, in this respect, investments of this sort appear 
unlikely when there is no practical or conceptual relevance. However, the rele-
vance of indicators certainly cannot be easily generalised– even though a more 
general relevance is very often insinuated. Even though indicators have become 
pervasive, their power and influence remain highly controversial. On the one 
hand, there are many examples of indicators that not only have come to be 
widely used but have even become crucial for the regulation of entire policy 
fields – two of the most prominent examples being the Gross Domestic Product 
(GDP) (Speich Chassé 2013; Lepenies 2016) and the unemployment rate (Innes 
[1990] 2004; Salais 2007). The GDP has been criticised for its hegemonial role 
                                                             
5  The term statistics refers to the science of collecting, summarising, and analysing numerical 
data as well as the result of these practices. 
HSR 44 (2019) 2  │  13 
as an informational base for collective decision-making (Anand and Sen 1994; 
Fioramonti 2017). Broadening the informational base of collective choices can 
be regarded as a crucial element of social inclusion (Sen 2011). Other indica-
tors have not received as much attention and are largely hidden from public 
scrutiny. They are known only to highly specialised groups of professionals – 
such as the indicators defining the borders of electoral districts or the amounts 
transferred in intergovernmental fiscal relations. Nevertheless, these “silent” 
administrative indicators can still be purported to perform key functions in the 
formulation or implementation of public policies. On the other hand, the power 
of indicators is questioned time and again – as in the case of environmental or 
social indicators. At other times, indicators are used by civil society actors 
worldwide, such as the Corruption Perceptions Index (Beschel 2018; Urueña 
2018; Musaraj 2018), but their degree of influence on official politics remains 
debatable. Against this backdrop we would like to focus our attention on those 
indicators that have become especially relevant for certain social fields. There-
fore, we suggest the following definition of key indicators: Indicators are key 
indicators if they refer to a social phenomenon, if they are used collectively, if 
they are attributed a relatively consensual meaning, and if their production, 
publication, and use have significant consequences for the constitution, repro-
duction or transformation of a particular social field. Such consequences might 
be intended or unintended. By adopting such a focus, research activities can 
concentrate on processes of quantification that are systematically linked to 
collective practices. It opens up several potential lines of research, such as 
investigating the genesis, use, and consequences of key indicators as well as 
inquiries into alternative ways of social coordination. 
In the following section we will sketch the role of key indicators as epistem-
ic devices that compete in shaping future expectations in society. 
3. Key Indicators and the Politics of Expectations 
The future is essentially uncertain, yet political actors have to create 
expectations about the future in order to make plans and to take collectively 
binding decisions. While rational choice theories assume that the essential 
uncertainty of the future can be transformed into calculable risk, Jens Beckert 
(2016; Beckert and Bronk 2018) has recently proposed conceptualising 
expectations as fictional in the sense that those who rely on them treat them as 
if they were certain to become reality, but essentially they are only claims on 
the future. The fictionality of expectations creates an incentive for actors to try 
to influence the expectations of others by creating credible accounts of future 
states of the world. We propose that indicators are crucial epistemic devices in 
the “politics of expectations” that facilitate formal and calculable conceptions 
of uncertain futures (Beckert 2016, 79-85). In order to elaborate on how key 
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indicators evoke images and narratives of the future, we differentiate between a 
factual, a social, and a temporal dimension of indicators (Luhmann [1984] 
2005, 59-102). We will first explain these three dimensions and consequently 
show how they are related to particular politics of expectations. 
The factual dimension of indicators can be conceived as the relationship 
they establish with their external referent. This relationship can be established 
within a descriptive, causal, or normative framework. Descriptive cognitive 
frameworks of indicators are often chosen for a rather pragmatic reason, such 
as data availability. In such a descriptive cognitive framework, valuations are 
not absent, for counting is an assignment of value, however they remain implic-
it rather than being explicitly articulated. Information about objects of interest 
is recorded and compared in a social (cross-sectional) or in an ipsative (longi-
tudinal) descriptive framework or a combination of both. A social descriptive 
framework means that similar units are compared at one point in time, while an 
ipsative descriptive framework means that the same social unit is compared to 
itself at different points in time. Sometimes such a purely descriptive approach 
is seen as a preliminary stage in the development process of an indicator sys-
tem whose ultimate aim is to develop a more analytical or normative concept 
(e.g. Döbert 2007, 17). However, the systematic description of standardised 
features transforms the object itself by expressing its hitherto hidden serial 
characteristics (Didier 2007). Percentages are a simple but historically crucial 
technique of descriptive statistics that enable the comparison of different units 
(Prévost and Beaud 2012, 9-26). When indicators operationalise more complex 
phenomena, explicit concepts aid interpretation by establishing an epistemic 
object and relating the phenomena of interest to the chosen indicators (Lehto-
nen 2015, 78). Explicit concepts are needed when indicator development aims 
to draw a descriptive or causal inference about a phenomenon (Stinchcombe 
and Wendt 1975). Conceptual ambivalence within descriptive or causal models 
can be a threat to indicator validity as they create an exploitable space for the 
influence of cultural repertoires of interpretation and political interests in the 
quantification process (Mayntz 2017). In a normative cognitive framework, 
changes in an indicator’s direction have a clear interpretation in terms of their 
desirability. While there are many indicators in which the desirability of the 
direction of change seems to be clear, this impression might nevertheless be 
challenged by disputes and critique: To what extent is a growth in GDP really 
desirable (Fioramonti 2017)? For whom is it desirable? However, the desirabil-
ity of the direction of change becomes objectified when political targets are 
explicitly set in a numerical form, such as in (organisational) performance 
measurement (Carter, Klein, and Day 1992; Lewis 2017; Le Galès 2018) or in 
target-driven public policy (Hodson and Maher 2001; Bruno, Jany-Catrice, and 
Touchelay 2016; Boswell 2018). While quantitative measurement is not the 
only form of valuation and evaluation, its growing importance in current socie-
ty is rarely disputed (Lamont 2012). Numerical targets may be set in positive or 
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in negative terms (prescriptive vs. proscriptive indicators), with proscriptive 
indicators having received less attention than their prescriptive counterparts 
(Carter, Klein, and Day 1992). Hence, with respect to the factual dimension of 
indicators, we summarise that indicators might be purely descriptive, integrated 
into a causal model, and/or become part of an explicit normative framework of 
directed social change. While the underlying cognitive frameworks could be 
seen as hierarchically ordered stages, with the higher stages requiring a full 
establishment of the lower ones, such an interpretation might be too strong. 
University rankings, for example, can be regarded as being descriptive indica-
tors that are interpreted in a normative way, although it is not at all clear what a 
particular ranking position means in a causal model of the processes of higher 
education learning and research (Mayntz 2017). Therefore, the underlying 
concept of an indicator is not part of its inherent features but can only be in-
ferred from typical patterns of interpretation and use. 
The social dimension of indicators is based on categorical distinctions and 
might become relevant for the construction of social identities. The generated 
categories might be clear-cut or relatively ambiguous, such as when they are 
based on hybrid categories or indicate continuous properties. The social dimen-
sion of indicators is inscribed into the way it measures object properties and in 
the way it defines units of analysis. First, properties of interest of an object 
might be measured on a nominal scale according to social categories: gender, 
race, or ethnicity are typical sociodemographic examples. Second, the proper-
ties of interest might be measured on a higher scale (ordinal, interval, ratio) but 
are attributed to (individual or collective) social actors. When the population of 
a political territory is counted, for example, the resulting indicator is on a ratio 
scale because it has a “true” zero point. The social dimension in UN population 
statistics, for example, results from the fact that, in order to include persons and 
territories, they have to be defined as objects and/or political units of interest 
(Heintz 2012). Hence, UN statistics contribute to the constitution of the modern 
individual as being endowed with equal human rights and the nation state as a 
legitimate actor in international relations. While it is debatable whether space 
constitutes a separate dimension of meaning (Stichweh 1998, 2008), the territo-
rial demarcation of space in politics is a clear marker of social inclu-
sion/exclusion – brought into question by migration (Bommes 1999). Further-
more, the social dimension of territorial indicators is evident when their 
application becomes the basis for assigning responsibility to governments for 
taking action and for holding them accountable. Reports on fine particle pollu-
tion in cities, for example, assign the responsibility for reducing excessive 
values to the local government (Haus and Zimmermann 2007). In these cases, 
the territorialisation of a spatial distribution constitutes a political actor as a 
social addressee. Obviously, the social dimension of indicators can offer multi-
ple opportunities for identification: e.g. when the labour market integration of 
foreign nationals in East Germany is higher than in West Germany (Winkler 
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2019), both the distinctions foreigners/natives and East/West Germany can be 
reinforced in further practices. The introduction of new categories of classifica-
tion, such as the US census category “Hispanics”, can change patterns of iden-
tification (Mora 2014). Counting the members of a group makes them “visible” 
(Brighenti 2017). Similarly, it can be assumed that avoiding the application of 
existing social classifications during the production of indicators, such as the 
dichotomous black-white distinction in the US census (Prewitt 2013), might 
contribute to a blurring of social boundaries (Telles and Paschel 2014) but also 
to a neglect of social problems relating to particular subgroups (Simon 2015). 
Similarly, problems of exclusion appear when there is a lack of data on certain 
populations with increased health risks (Davis 2017). Processes of social iden-
tity formation based on categorisation and quantification are not restricted to 
individuals but can also be observed among organisations (Kennedy 2008; 
Wheaton and Carroll 2017; Tyllström, Granqvist, and Durand 2017) and politi-
cal territories (Heintz 2012). Overall, it can be assumed that ascribed properties 
are more prone to forming social identity than achieved properties. 
Finally, the temporal dimension of indicators captures whether indicators 
measure past developments or whether they project future developments. De-
scriptive indicators are very often retrospective time series which implicitly 
assume that these developments will continue on into the future. An example of 
this would be school results where parents extrapolate their children’s labour 
market chances from their results on large-scale standardised assessment tests 
(Peetz 2014, 161-67). If they are used in causal models, the implicit assumption 
is that the measured variables and their relationship will remain relevant in the 
future. Future projections explicitly aim to account for the contingency of the 
future by formulating assumptions about possible future developments. This 
contingency can be further highlighted through the explication of different 
possible scenarios such as in the population projections of statistical agencies 
(c.f. Anson, Bartl, and Kulczycki 2019, 5). While the projections themselves 
still retain the fundamental contingency of the future, social actors seemingly 
reduce this contingency through fictional expectations as if a particular scenar-
io will come true. This reduction is essential for education planning, for exam-
ple (Jones 1975; Magrini et al. 2011). While, in oversimplified conceptions, 
planning processes could be conceived as a unilateral action within a hierar-
chical governance setting, fictional expectations and the politics surrounding it 
are also essential for other governance settings such as markets (Reichmann 
2018). As Beckert notes for capitalist dynamics:  
If resources for innovation are allocated based on promissory stories whose 
future success is uncertain, then actors will inevitably contest not just the dis-
tribution of these resources, but also the imaginaries surrounding innovations 
(Beckert 2016, 184).  
However, there is a crucial tension between the competition for credible imagi-
naries and the emphasis on consensus building inherent in instruments of imag-
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ination and foresight (Andersson 2017, 310). Recently, there seems to be an 
increasing relevance of prospective indicators across governance modes. Such 
a shift towards an explicit articulation of future expectations is obvious, for 
example, in inflation targeting (Bernanke and Mishkin 1997; Braun 2018). 
Nowadays, central banks assume that an inflation rate of around two per cent 
will support stable economic growth. They announce their inflation target, as 
well as policy measures that aim to achieve it, in order to influence the inflation 
expectations of other economic actors. Other examples are policy targets that 
are formulated in quantitative terms and progress that is measured by political-
ly defined indicators as in the global governance of sustainable development 
(United Nations 2016). In other fields, such as innovation policy in nanotech-
nology, it has proven notoriously difficult to make quantitative projections 
about future developments. While there have been quantitative analyses of 
patents (Heinze 2004) and of the creativity of scientists in this field (Heinze 
and Bauer 2014), these approaches have not been used to make projections 
about future developments. Interestingly, existing attempts to develop quantita-
tive projections (Palmberg, Dernis, and Miguet 2009; Papilloud 2010) increas-
ingly have to compete with what has been termed “qualitative indicators”, i.e. 
expert judgements about future developments in the field of nanomedicine 
(Gouze and Boisseau 2013). Although, these qualitative indicators are not 
quantified and hence not indicators in the sense of the definition used in this 
introduction, they are nevertheless devices used to shape expectations about the 
future. It is especially striking that this qualitative judgement device appears 
with a disguise (“indicator”) that is typically associated with quantification. 
Apparently, this camouflage strategy aims at capturing the aura of objectivity 
attached to indicators while retaining the flexible case logic of expert judge-
ment. A similar phenomenon of disguise is revealed by ethnographic studies on 
the production of economic forecasting: what appears to be a purely mathemat-
ical practice is in reality embedded in a discursive process of judgement and 
interpretation (Beckert 2016, 232; Reichmann 2018). In many cases the use of 
future-oriented target indicators is intended to mobilise collective action, such 
as investment by private and public actors. In other cases, future projections 
aim to mobilise disinvestment, such as in fossil fuel reduction (Ayling and 
Gunningham 2017), outdated technology (Knopf et al. 2010; Ward et al. 2017) 
or overcapacities in public schools (Bartl and Sackmann 2016). However, 
critics of future projections that indicate seemingly inevitable developments, 
such as negative demographic growth, argue that these projections will likely 
demotivate genuine political debate by suggesting overwhelming factual con-
straints (Barlösius 2007; Sackmann and Bartl 2008; Messerschmidt 2014). In 
urban development strategies, projections of growing population numbers are 
automatically translated into a requirement to build new housing (Brorström 
2018, 22). Yet, in many cases, future projections are used in public to prevent 
their imagined content from becoming real (Lau and Beck 1989, 143). 
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In order to present an example of how the three dimensions of indicators in-
teract in shaping imaginations and narratives of the future, we will take a brief 
look at the history of population statistics, which have become one of the most 
important key indicators of modern state governance. When observing the 
historical genesis and use of population indicators, it appears that their social 
dimension is more important than their factual and temporal dimensions as 
long as they are only descriptive and retrospective indicators. Population statis-
tics ascribe a population of relevant social groups to a particular territory. 
Through quantification, the counting authority accumulates power knowledge 
and renders the epistemic object governable. Hence, by including and identify-
ing certain groups, population indicators express social identities and social 
relationships. The census or register-based enumerations of populations are 
probably the oldest and most well-known examples of the production of indica-
tors which, in their most rudimentary form, date back to Babylonian times 
around 4500 B.C. (Ventresca 1995, 26; c.f. United Nations 1969, 1). For a long 
time population counts were highly selective (e.g. only free men were includ-
ed) and purpose-specific; a more inclusive definition of the population was 
only gradually established through transitional census activities at the turn of 
the 18th and 19th centuries. During the 19th century, the idea emerged that all 
individuals should be categorised and counted as members of national “imag-
ined communities”, which is constitutive of the modern census (Ventresca 
1995, 40-45; Anderson [1983] 2006, 168-69).6 Since then, statistics on popula-
tion, territory and the economy have been designed more and more systemati-
cally by western bureaucracies (Desrosières [1993] 2005). Although the for-
mation of informational capital has sometimes been contested (Loveman 2005), 
it has become fundamental to the organisation of state administration in general 
and to the structure of individual policy fields – not forgetting the administra-
tion of genocide, e.g. in Nazi Germany (Mackensen, Reulecke, and Ehmer 
2009; Kühl 2014).  
As long as population indicators are used in a retrospective and descriptive 
framework, it is their social dimension, the creation of identities, and the de-
scription of social relations that seem to be most salient. However, the stabilis-
ing effect of population indicators is diminished when they are projected into 
the future. First, projections have to make assumptions about causal relation-
ships (the simplest one being a linear extrapolation of past trends) and second, 
they focus on change indicators rather than stock indicators. Apart from ad-
vances in science, several historical developments have contributed to the 
increasing relevance of technologies of foresight. The incipient establishment 
of the welfare state in Europe in the late 19th century, the economic crisis of 
                                                             
6  Another strategy of counting populations is the establishment of population registers. “The 
earliest population registers in Europe were the parish registers of Sweden and Finland, 
which originated during the seventeenth century” (United Nations 1969, 1-2). 
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the 1930s, nascent environmental debates from the 1920s onwards, and the 
perceived threat of a nuclear attack during the cold war lead to the increasing 
use of technologies of foresight as part of modern state governance in fields 
such as social security, economic policy, the environment, and national security 
(Lengwiler 2010; Andersson 2017). Population indicators have been crucial 
variables in these technologies of foresight since natural demographic change is 
supposed to be highly predictable. Critics of demographic projections either see 
other variables – such as economic growth and redistribution – as more im-
portant in shaping the future of modern society or they emphasise that the 
projections themselves are inherently uncertain – e.g. because of unpredictable 
shifts in migration flows (Nullmeier and Wrobel 2005; Schultz 2015, 2018).  
But demographic projections are obviously just one device used in the poli-
tics of expectations and more devices are still waiting to be explored by further 
research on this topic. In the following section we will give an overview of 
theoretical approaches towards the empirical analysis of the genesis and use of 
indicators in modern society. 
4. Approaches for Analysing the Genesis and Use of 
Indicators in Politics 
The objective of utilization (in politics) has been claimed as a defining feature 
of indicators (Lehtonen 2015, 78; Espeland 2015). At the same time this aim is 
very often not achieved or at least not in the intended way. Against this contra-
dictory backdrop, how can we systematically describe and explain the use of 
indicators in politics? How can we explain that some indicators are not only 
used regularly and collectively but have become key indicators in the sense that 
they structure entire social or policy fields? Our impression is that the – very 
often contentious – processes through which indicators become institutional-
ized as key elements of policy formulation and implementation are still poorly 
understood:  
Research and development work in the area has hitherto overwhelmingly con-
centrated on improving the technical quality of indicators, while the fate of in-
dicators in policymaking and the associated sociopolitical aspects have at-
tracted little attention (Lehtonen 2015, 77).  
Therefore, in this section we would like to scrutinise which theoretical ap-
proaches would allow the formulation of some propositions about the use of 
indicators in politics.  
4.1  Diachronic Approaches 
The use of numbers in state governance was among the earliest topics touched 
upon in the nascent field of quantification studies. In this subsection we present 
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approaches towards analysing the genesis and use of numbers in politics whose 
primary foci complement each other and which share a historical perspective, 
emphasising complex interdependencies and contingent developments. 
The work of Michel Foucault shows how increasingly quantified knowledge 
has become a constitutive element of liberal state governance (Rose 1991). In 
his analysis of the history of governmentality he identified various technologies 
of power that dominated different historical periods; in the most recent, the 
governmentality of security, the production of knowledge and hence (official) 
statistics become crucial for governing modern society (Foucault [2004] 
2006b).7 Instead of only regarding the population as a multitude of legal per-
sons who are the object of state domination, the 18th century witnessed the 
emergence of the notion that the population possesses its own “nature” and is a 
productive force in the political economy. Based on the latter notion of the 
population, the security dispositive focuses on the statistical observation of 
regularities in the economy and aims to examine the liberal government of 
risks, which requires systematic calculation based on statistics. Liberal policies 
of agricultural production were first implemented in England in the late 17th 
century, allowing for the market-based establishment of wheat prices with the 
possibility of exports and tariffs on wheat imports as security mechanisms. The 
liberal thinking of the French Physiocrats integrated the experience of the Eng-
lish experiment into a political economy of strategical laissez faire in which the 
population became a productive element. The German Ordo-liberals and the 
US Anarcho-liberals were two waves of economic thought that voiced critique 
against what they perceived to be “too much government”. They strived to 
revive liberalism which had lost its influence during the turbulent first decades 
of the 20th century (Foucault [2004] 2006a, 442). The Ordo-liberals were in-
formed by Weber and Husserl and conceptualised the market as an ideal-type 
that can only be approximated by reality. In this – mainly macro-economic – 
framework, the social and legal preconditions of the market must be actively 
prepared by the state for the market to function. In contrast, US neo-liberalism 
analyses different fields of society as if they followed the micro-economic 
rationality of the homo economicus and assigns the state the task of actively 
propagating the extension of market rationality, e.g. by creating quasi-markets 
(Glennerster 1991; Le Grand 1991; c.f. Rose and Miller 1992, 198-201) in 
order to maximise human capital and hence innovation. However, while Fou-
cault analysed the discursive context in which the use of numbers for govern-
                                                             
7  What he describes is the hegemony of a legal-juridical mechanism that had been installed 
since the middle ages and the hegemony of a disciplinary mechanism from the 17th and 
18th centuries which was paralleled by a security mechanism from the 18th and 19th cen-
turies. While legal-juridical governmentality mainly linked forbidden behaviour to particular 
punishments, disciplinary governmentality put in place technologies of surveillance and in-
tervention with the aim of changing the behaviour of ‘deviant’ individuals. 
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ance purposes became crucial, he did not study the production and use of num-
bers themselves. Complementary to Foucault, Ian Hacking (1990) analysed the 
bureaucratic supply side that came to produce “an avalanche of numbers” pene-
trating many social fields. According to Hacking, the development of the no-
tion of the indeterminacy of the future, which is a crucial element in Foucault’s 
security dispositive, depended as much on scientific innovation as on demands 
stemming from the industrial revolution and the development of statistical 
bureaus for practical state purposes. The practice of the modern census, for 
example, was first established in the colonies in the 16th century, and only used 
in the colonising countries themselves from the 18th century onwards to govern 
populations (Hacking 1990, 17; cf. Kalpagam 2014; Duminy 2017).  
While Foucault and Hacking emphasise the strategic production and use of 
indicators by the state, other authors have argued that political numbers are not 
only a constitutive feature of democratic rule but that they also affect the gov-
erning as much as the governed (Rose 1999; Porter 1995). The space for indi-
vidual discretion and “irrational politics” is diminished when “statistical rules” 
are implemented (Starr 1987; Prewitt 1987). In the context of public admin-
istration, key indicators work as catalysers, stop rules, and distributive alloca-
tion criteria within formalised procedures. This rationalising potential of num-
bers as a particular form of democratic rule was also emphasised by Theodore 
Porter (1995); he makes the point that the increasing production and use of 
numbers in modern society responds to a demand for more “mechanical objec-
tivity”. Objectivity in the philosophy of science should ideally mean the ac-
quaintance with objects as they “really are”; but since that knowledge is basi-
cally unattainable, a consensus within a group of specialists is usually seen as 
sufficient for “disciplinary objectivity” (Porter 1995, 3). Objectivity is not only 
a scientific category but also relevant in moral and political discourse, usually 
indicating fairness and impartiality. The credibility of courts, for example, 
depends on the ability to elude charges of prejudice or personal interest that 
distort a judgement – and they do so through distributed decision-making and 
following the rule of law (Porter 1995, 4). But while judges were able to main-
tain significant autonomy in the face of demands for more mechanical objectiv-
ity, the discretionary space for expert judgement has been reduced more in 
weaker professions and groups of experts.8 The problem of separating 
knowledge from its local context emerges not only in science but also in politi-
cal and economic spheres (Porter 1995, 4-5). External demand for more “me-
chanical objectivity” stems from greater independence of people across large 
                                                             
8  An example of how expert judgement unfolds its authority in public administration is note-
writing (Mangset and Asdal 2018). The recording of information in written notes and the 
procedural evaluation of such notes within the practical life of bureaucratic hierarchies 
constitute a key form of expertise that yields authority. Another stronghold of expert 
judgement is peer review in academia (Hirschauer 2019). 
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(social and geographical) distances on the one hand, and the institutionalisation 
of the rule of law on the other. However, mechanical objectivity can never be 
fully mechanical because there always remains some ambiguity that cannot be 
resolved without some expertise despite all attempts of quantification accord-
ing to strict methodological rules. Hence, it is very often expertise backed by 
mechanical objectivity that is resorted to in order to make authoritative public 
claims or to regain public trust (Boswell 2018). More generally speaking, dem-
ocratic governance based on quantification and a related public discourse re-
quires a certain numeracy of the population and of the bureaucracy itself (Co-
hen 1982; Emigh 2002). These competences undergo collective learning 
processes (Lampland 2010; Bartl and Sackmann 2016) which are hampered 
under authoritarian rule because official statistics are very often not made pub-
lic but remain part of politicised bureaucratic procedures (e.g. Lippe 1999).  
A similar point about the centrality of official statistics for democratic gov-
ernance has been made from the point of view of the sociology of conventions. 
From his comparative history of academic and official statistics, Alain 
Desrosières concluded that official statistics form cognitive objects that func-
tion as reference points in democratic public debates (Desrosières [1993] 
2005). He regarded public access to official statistics as a crucial feature of 
democratic governance which also led him to prefer the term public over offi-
cial statistics (Diaz-Bone 2018, 355). Quantification processes resulting in 
public statistics require the establishment of conventions of equivalence 
(Desrosières 2016, 184). Desrosières conceptualised the genesis and use of 
statistical conventions as the result of a co-construction between state, market 
and society, and statistical practices resulting from the indeterminate circularity 
of knowledge and action (Desrosières 2005 [1993], 274-77). In this dynamic 
view, statistical objects interactively shape action and vice versa, i.e. the ob-
jects of knowledge as well as political programmes change according to prag-
matic requirements of coordination. Following this idea of a dynamic co-
construction, he elaborated a typology of corresponding historical forms of 
statistics and state intervention (Desrosières 2003, 2011). These forms should 
be understood as Weberian ideal types, as empirically they co-exist in history 
and may also conflict with each other. One possible source of conflict results 
from the process of quantification itself, which is organised in a highly special-
ised division of labour: the “statistical chain” (Diaz-Bone and Didier 2016, 16). 
Far from being entirely consistent across the statistical chain, different methods 
of quantification can produce conflicts of compatibility (Desrosières 2007).9 
Such conflicts of compatibility are especially salient with regard to internation-
al comparisons (Cussó 2016). Conversely, the harmonisation of methods (not 
                                                             
9  In constellations of valuation – such as a statistical chain – potential conflicts are usually 
mediated by transsituational criteria of evaluation and material infrastructures (Meier, 
Peetz, and Waibel 2016, 313).  
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only of results), which is at stake when it comes to international comparisons, 
especially reinforced within the EU and OECD, would create an equivalence 
space that reaches beyond national conventions of quantification (Diaz-Bone 
2018, 351-54; Åkerman, Auranen, and Valkeasuo 2018; Alastalo 2018). Com-
pared to Foucault’s analysis of dispositives, Desrosières’ account of statistical 
conventions focuses more on the quantification process itself. It appears to be 
historically more nuanced since it pays more attention to the variability of ideal 
types of quantification-intervention co-constructions.10  
These historical perspectives do not lend themselves easily to formulating 
expectations about the use of numbers in politics. What could be proposed is 
that the state, as an archetype of centralised decision-making, will generate 
indicators within administrative routines and strategically use these statistics in 
order to strengthen its position in society. Furthermore, it can be concluded that 
weak experts, e.g. those in disagreement, are more prone to back their authority 
with mechanical objectivity than stronger expert communities that agree on a 
specific subject matter. Finally, all of the approaches described above point 
towards temporal dynamics: typical constellations of quantification and (politi-
cal) action as well as processes of collective learning.  
4.2  Synchronic Approaches 
Distinguishing between diachronic and synchronic approaches towards the 
genesis and use of indicators might suggest that the latter have a rather static 
view of their subject. While such a reading would be misleading, we use the 
term synchronic for those approaches that focus mainly on contemporary socie-
ty and place their focus on a potential gap between the genesis and use of indi-
cators. Such a gap has variously been observed when indicators are explicitly 
designed to influence policy but are perceived to fail in doing so (Lehtonen 
2015, 88). Furthermore, our distinction between indicators and key indicators 
similarly reflects a potential hiatus between the genesis and widespread use of 
indicators. Such a hiatus is especially visible in the indicators developed since 
the late 1960s in the framework of the “social reporting movement” (Duncan 
1969, 13) but also for more recent environmental (Hezri 2005) and perfor-
mance indicators (Mike and Balás 2015; Henman 2018). Building on a case 
study of the use of local sustainability indicators, it has been critically argued 
that neo-Foucauldian tendencies that emphasise the power effects of govern-
ance tools and downplay problems of their application should be rebalanced by 
more nuanced accounts of how these tools enable resistance and agency (Rydin 
2007, 621). In a similar vein, Rose and Miller (1992, 190) pointed to the poten-
tially unexpected outcomes of seemingly perfectly designed governance tools 
                                                             
10  The earlier work of Foucault (2005, 183) even assumed that only one episteme was present 
in a particular historical period. 
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resulting from inconsistencies with other bureaucratic routines. The remainder 
of this subsection will be devoted to approaches identifying determinants of the 
institutionalisation process of (potential) key indicators that lead to their effec-
tive use or non-use.  
The intention of influencing public policy which, already at the stage of 
their conceptualisation, is crucial for many indicators, is present for example in 
a classical definition of social indicators. It states that they are statistical time 
series “…used to monitor the social system, helping to identify changes and to 
guide intervention to alter the course of social change” (Ferriss 1988, 601). 
Such an instrumental approach toward social change had and, to some extent, 
continues to have significant appeal; however, it also contains problematic and 
somewhat unrealistic implications: First, it implies that if politics were guided 
by objective, quantified knowledge, this would be more rational than politics 
that only has subjective arguments and speculative claims. Furthermore, if 
policy-makers were equipped with clear-cut problem definitions and demanded 
quantitative information, these demands could be met by indicator research. 
While, to our knowledge, there is no scientific theory that explicitly proposes a 
simple and direct connection between the development of indicators and their 
use in politics, it has variously been claimed that the practice of indicator re-
search – which focuses almost exclusively on methodological aspects – implic-
itly displays such an assumption, at least as a lay theory (Boulanger 2007, 16-
17).  
In order to examine more in-depth the problem of indicator use in politics, a 
differentiation has been made between the production and the utilisation pro-
cesses of indicators (Lehtonen 2015). The distinction between these two stages 
in the life-cycle of indicators emphasises that the two might involve different 
social fields with different sets of actors which could inhibit the intended use of 
indicators in politics. For example, indicators might be produced either inside 
state administrations or outside, such as in relatively autonomous research 
institutions or civil society organisations. Furthermore, indicators might remain 
peripheral to the policy cycle or become a central part of collectively binding 
decision-making and implementation.  
However, only few papers have addressed the potential gap between the 
genesis and use of indicators in such a way as to enable expectations to be 
formulated with regard to empirical research. Richard Rose (1972), for exam-
ple, addressed the potential use of social indicators in public policy from a 
bounded rationality perspective. Following March and Simon (1993), he starts 
from the assumption that indicators are not in competition with other potential 
sources of information but instead with the existing sources of information 
regarded as satisfactory by office holders. From this perspective, one precondi-
tion for the use of new information is that it matches the cognitive concepts in 
use: “What the policy-maker needs is help, i.e. information that can be related 
to the concepts that he uses; anything else, even if cognized, is no more than 
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‘indigestible facts’” (Rose 1972, 123). Therefore, he proposes that indicators be 
used only if they refer to information that signifies something meaningful in 
terms of the cognitive and normative concepts used by policy-makers. He ar-
gues that several “costs” might inhibit the use of indicators, such as those of 
producing and consuming them, value conflicts arising from politically salient 
topics, costs of action resulting from the resistance of interest groups benefit-
ting from the status quo as well as costs of inaction, such as media attention 
and external pressure (Rose 1972, 124-6). Hence, the “costs” of indicator use 
are partially determined by the design of the indicator itself and partially by its 
social circumstances. On the other hand, the potential utility of a new metric 
cannot be evaluated based on present data. Instead its utility, which could out-
weigh related costs, remains a claim on the future. Therefore, there is an ex-
pected tendency towards established information practices (Rose 1972).  
A middle ground between the somewhat unrealistic expectation of a direct 
instrumental use of indicators in politics and a fairly pessimistic prediction of 
non-use of new indicators in politics can be found in utilisation research and in 
science studies. Since indicators are often developed by academics or by ex-
perts working in relatively autonomous research units of public administration, 
it has been suggested that a broader perspective be taken and that approaches 
be considered which describe not only the use of numbers but the use of scien-
tific knowledge in politics more generally (Beck and Bonß 1984). The litera-
ture on knowledge utilisation has proposed several concepts of use (for an 
overview see: Gudmundsson et al. 2009, 38-55). A classic definition lists six 
forms of use that are ordered in a (normatively) hierarchical way: a) reception 
by policy-makers, b) cognition, c) change in reference framework, d) effort for 
adoption, e) adoption in policy decisions, f) implementation of policy, g) 
achievement of desired impact for citizens (Knott and Wildavsky 1980). With 
each step a (normatively) more significant form of utilisation is achieved. It is 
evident that this enumeration corresponds to a popular input-output model of 
policy-making. As far as it is useful to follow such a model, we think it would 
be fruitful to clearly distinguish forms of utilisation (a-f) from their impact (g).  
A crucial finding in knowledge use research has been that there is no direct 
relationship between individual scientific results and particular policy deci-
sions. Rather, it was observed that a critical mass of research in a particular 
direction can indeed influence the policy agenda and catalyse conceptual 
changes in policy-making (Weiss 1977). The diffusion of scientific knowledge 
through mass media is an important channel of information for policy-makers 
(Weiss 1979, 429). The diffusion of scientific knowledge through intermediary 
channels does not leave research findings unchanged but instead “trivialises” 
them (Beck and Bonß 1984, 384). Indeed, scientific knowledge becomes effec-
tive by losing its scientific identity and becoming part of the mundane common 
sense of the audience. While research on the use of scientific knowledge has 
not focused explicitly on the role of indicators, some authors in this line of 
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inquiry saw a great potential for establishing shared problem definitions 
through the provision of merely descriptive data (Lau 1989, 398). According to 
Lau, it is precisely the expertise necessary to choose between methods and the 
tacit knowledge required to implement quantitative methods effectively which 
provides a source for professional authority (cf. Porter 1995, 7). Applied to 
indicators, one could expect that periodical publication and interpretation of 
indicators, as well as their systematic integration, would increase the probabil-
ity of them being used in politics or influencing the policy agenda. While the 
aspiration of influencing policy decisions was largely disappointed, it is recog-
nised however that indicators influence the policy cycle most notably during 
the stages of agenda setting and problem definition (Innes [1990] 2004; Bou-
langer 2007). One strategy of overcoming the perceived gap between the pro-
duction and use of indicators has been their participatory development (Innes 
1998).  
In important foundational texts, Actor-Network Theory (ANT) was not di-
rectly concerned with the use of indicators in politics but with the production 
and utilisation of scientific facts (Callon 1984; Latour 1986, 1987). Neverthe-
less, the authors suggested that the observed processes are of more general 
relevance. The problem of scientific claims is their hostile environment and the 
irreducible potential of refuting others.11 Therefore scientists build up long 
chains of material and symbolic evidence, ultimately brought together in a 
scientific publication. A crucial element in summarising and “solidifying” 
research findings are numbers that are laboriously compiled throughout the 
research process, allowing for calculation across large spatial and social dis-
tances and for visualising evidence. Nevertheless, the attempt to build up per-
suasive power may still fail and later research may attack previously estab-
lished facts by enlisting more allies in its network. Hence, in this account, 
numbers are inscription devices, elements that can travel across time and space 
without being changed (Latour 1986). However, the stability that they lend to 
scientific facts is only temporal. The process of interesting allies and audiences 
is conceptualised as a constant translation of interests that very often entails a 
transformation of the scientific objects themselves. That is why Latour (1987) 
argues for a model of translation rather than a model of diffusion of innova-
tions. Slightly modifying the ANT model of translation, Star and Griesemer 
(1989) have argued that the problem of translating the interests of others in 
one’s own language only requires a consensus between “boundary objects”, not 
between the different groups. When cooperation occurs across heterogeneous 
social worlds, only an exchange of information is necessary, while the autono-
my of these social worlds can be maintained. The parties willing to cooperate 
                                                             
11  Bettina Heintz (2007) identifies a similar problem following Luhmann’s theory of communi-
cation. According to the different features of language and numbers as media of communi-
cation, numbers seem better suited for overcoming the uncertainty of dissent.  
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develop an interest in boundary objects that are situated between their worlds. 
While communication across field boundaries accentuates the general proper-
ties of a boundary object, its specific aspects are crucial when used locally (Star 
2010). Hence, boundary objects fit both general and specific purposes. This 
more general observation has been discussed with regard to the development 
and use of indicators as well (Bauler 2012; Turnhout 2009). However, taking 
into account the concept of Callon and Latour regarding the stability of objects 
as a constant struggle, it becomes clear that this ability to travel between social 
spheres is more an unstable achievement of significant investments than an 
inherent quality of objects (cf. Bauler 2012; Turnhout 2009).12 When crucial 
allies leave the agencement of the network, the scientific project loses its use-
fulness (Callon 1984). On the other hand, if many actors have an interest in 
using an indicator, they will fight to keep it (Innes [1990] 2004). 
This brief overview of central analytical approaches to the genesis and use 
of indicators yields the following results: Diachronic approaches conceptualise 
the genesis and use of indicators as a historically contingent process and there-
fore do not lend themselves easily to deriving analytical hypotheses. Govern-
mentality studies suggest that public officials generate indicators strategically 
for instrumental and rhetoric purposes – according to Porter, especially when 
trust in their expertise is questioned. In these accounts the use of indicators 
seems to follow their genesis quite naturally. Synchronic approaches, on the 
other hand, emphasise that the institutionalisation and use of indicators very 
often fail – indicators designed to influence a particular policy field fail to do 
so in a direct sense. Research on knowledge utilisation suggests that they could 
gain conceptual influence through the intermediation of mass media. Latour 
and Callon would argue that the likelihood that an indicator is used in politics 
increases if it manages to translate political interests into the language of sci-
ence and builds up consistent chains of reference: facts that seem to speak for 
themselves. However, creating such boundary objects requires many invest-
ments and is a highly risky endeavour. 
Some twenty years ago Theodore Porter bemoaned that:  
The growing role of quantitative expertise in the making of public decisions is 
a development well known to scholars. Yet we have no satisfactory histories 
of it (Porter 1995, 6).  
Today we have more histories of the role of indicators in politics; yet, we still 
lack sufficiently systematic accounts that would allow the diversity of results 
reflected by these histories to be integrated. On the one hand, many of the 
empirical contributions to this special issue further increase the diversity of 
existing results. On the other hand, some contributions are more conceptual in 
                                                             
12  Callon (1984) parallels the process of “interessement” to the concept of “investment in 
forms” (Thévenot 1984). 
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nature and nurture the expectation that more integrated narratives are not com-
pletely out of reach.  
5.  The Papers in this Special Issue of HSR 
The contributions to this special issue fit more or less into three categories: a) 
theoretical approaches to analysing the use of indicators in politics; b) studies 
of the genesis and use of key indicators in exemplary policy fields (economic 
policy, social and health policy, science and education policy); and c) alterna-
tive indicators. 
In the first section on theoretical approaches to analysing the use of indica-
tors, Laurent Thévenot proposes a clarification and revaluation of the meaning 
of “measure” as it has been used in the tradition of Alain Desrosières. He dis-
tinguishes between three meanings of measure, the first one being quantifica-
tion, the second one being a balancing of a plurality of valuations and the third 
one being indicators. Reflecting on these three meanings of measure, Thévenot 
contrasts their use in national statistics, and shows a shift in governing by num-
bers, introduced by the digitisation of quantification and measurement that, 
accordingly to Thévenot, is mainly used today to track individuals.  
Rainer Diaz-Bone pulls together the critical contributions of French theory 
on quantification (Alain Desrosière), French critical pragmatism (Luc Boltan-
ski and Laurent Thévenot), and the microphysics of power developed by 
Michel Foucault. He proposes that statistics be understood as a means of con-
trol similar to what Foucault has called “panopticism” (Foucault 1995). He 
recalls the current importance of numerical data as a core element of social 
control, where numerical data are used to create a “statistical panopticism” as a 
new and powerful governance form in our societies.  
The paper by Timo Walter picks up the temporal dimension of indicators by 
reflecting on the preconditions that enable central banks to engage in expecta-
tion management. Since the 1980s, central banks around the world have trans-
formed their monetary policy from a “hydraulic” manipulation of money ag-
gregates into the direct coordination of the expectations of market actors in 
order to control inflation. Focusing on the US Federal Reserve’s prototype 
development of inflation targeting, this paper argues that under conditions of 
fundamental uncertainty that defy rational calculation, the formation of expec-
tations inextricably depends on prior processes of formalisation. The reduction-
ism involved in these processes might, in turn, decrease the overall effective-
ness of the monetary policy. Therefore, Walter concludes that there is a need 
for a closer examination of how formal and informal modes of central bank 
coordination are mutually interdependent and what that means for their conse-
quences. 
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At the intersection of political sociology and organisation studies, Ingo 
Bode’s contribution inspects the role of numbers and quantification methods in 
public services at both an intraorganisational and a sectorial level. Theoretical-
ly reflecting empirical findings from several empirical studies, he argues that 
public services have been affected by a blurring of boundaries towards the 
capitalistic economy, whose use of numbers and indicators is the symptom. 
This process puts considerable stress on the agents and organisations involved. 
It aims to achieve a kind of “perfect service” where quantified techniques ena-
ble the rationalisation of management techniques, as Bode shows in the Ger-
man case of human service provision. 
In the second section of this volume dealing with the genesis of indicators in 
exemplary policy fields, John Berten historically reconstructs how, since the 
1920s and 1930s, the International Survey of Social Services has produced 
methods of quantification of social security schemes worldwide in order to 
compare them. This historical analysis shows how difficult it was for the Sur-
vey to create a grounded comparison on a global scale, as well as the several 
methods which have been mobilised in order to attain this goal over the years.  
Oscar Javier Maldonado and Tiago Moreira explore the historical genesis 
and use of standards and metrics in global health, and in particular the Disabil-
ity Adjusted Life Year (DALY) indicator. The aim of introducing health metrics 
is to produce equity across populations worldwide through the comparison of 
health policies and practices across political territories. While the authors 
acknowledge that neo-liberal discourse supports such a global health policy, 
they also show that this kind of reasoning does not entirely capture the contro-
versies and uncertainties around the DALY, which strives to dovetail meas-
urements of health with normative ideals.  
Michael Huber and Maarten Hillebrandt describe the development and use 
of new quantitative indicators in the German higher education system since the 
1990s, being part of managerialistic performance-oriented resource allocations. 
In contrast to traditional cameralistic ways of using numbers - mostly in a 
retrospective fashion - these new indicators clearly engage in a politics of ex-
pectations by setting numerical performance targets and evaluating progress. 
Huber and Hillebrandt regard these indicators, combined with global budget-
ing, to be at the root of a shift, transforming universities, once considered to be 
overly rigid public bureaucracies, into adaptable organisations learning on the 
basis of quantified information. Central university bodies increasingly act in a 
strategic way by creating internal resource competition among their faculties 
and investing in promised achievements – usually backed by proof of past 
performance. 
Also analysing the social life of indicators in recent public management re-
forms, Lisa Knoll and Konstanze Senge show the complex challenges related to 
the genesis of valid indicators of public debt in Europe. This process is strongly 
supported by the European Commission, which hopes to induce governments 
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to optimise their debt levels, and at the same time to find creative solutions at 
both levels of accounting and financing public services. They describe two 
models used by governments to attain this goal. The first is committed to accu-
rate and impartial identification of national debt levels, and the second aims at 
a more efficient management of public debt via public-private partnerships.  
Carlotta Mozzana investigates the use of indicators in the frame of the allo-
cation of money to young people gaining their first professional experience in 
Italy. Numbers and indicators were systematised in an Italian national pro-
gramme entitled Youth Guarantee and launched in 2013. This programme uses 
a profiling system to assess which young people could benefit from access to 
financial support in order to fill gaps in young people’s educational and profes-
sional experience. The expectations nurtured by this assessment form the oper-
ational base for an investive social policy. 
In times marked by increasing quantification, the survival of school inspec-
torates, a government technique based on direct observation and expert judge-
ment dating back to the 19th century, may seem surprising (Clarke 2014). 
Against this backdrop, Anne Piezunka’s paper explores the strategies of Ger-
man school inspectors who try to maintain their external evaluations as an 
institution in the face of – in international comparison – relatively powerful 
teaching professions and school heads. Piezunka identifies two typical strate-
gies: While their practice is based on a mix of standardised indicators and 
expert authority, school inspectors refrain from making very explicit evaluative 
judgements and focus on “mere” description. Furthermore, school inspectors 
give school representatives a greater say in formulating expectations for future 
school development. Playing down the potential control function of external 
evaluations, school inspectors use their indicators to catalyse deliberative inter-
action with school representatives as equal partners.  
Falling into the third category of alternative indicators, Philipp Lepenies us-
es a historical approach to analyse how national governments have embarked 
on an OECD-driven endeavour of developing national alternative measures of 
well-being “beyond GDP”. This project relates to a participatory process aim-
ing to create new indicators able to renew the definition of progress in the 21st 
century. Lepenies underlines the revolutionary character of this aspiration. At 
the same time, he shows that many initiatives do not live up to their expecta-
tions. This has to do with the manner in which they were executed, with the 
political unwillingness to really consider alternatives to GDP and to allow 
broad participation. But it might also demonstrate that the expectations regard-
ing the power of indicators to guide policies could be exaggerated. 
Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium (DGSE) models, the dominant ap-
proach in recent decades for modelling the economy, have come under severe 
critique since the financial crisis (Haldane 2018). In response to this critique, 
Oliver Holtemöller and Christoph Schult compare the forecasting performance 
of DGSE models and their extended versions, taking alternative expectation 
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formation assumptions and financial frictions into account. The authors show 
that neither alternative expectation formation behaviour nor financial frictions 
can systematically increase the forecasting performance of simple estimated 
macroeconomic models. Only during periods of financial crises do financial 
frictions improve forecasts. In contrast, traditional price and wage rigidities 
systematically help to increase the forecasting performance. 
6.  Conclusion 
As an introduction to this special issue on the use of indicators as governance 
devices and as calculative instruments enabling formal representations of imag-
ined futures, we attempt to make three points that shall be summarised briefly: 
First, we proposed a rather broad definition of indicators that would allow for 
systematic comparisons between different forms of quantification. We argued 
for distinguishing indicators from qualitative devices of evaluating future de-
velopments – despite some of them being dubbed “qualitative indicators”. Such 
a distinction allows for systematic comparisons between different media of 
communication. Second, we strategically put forward a definition of key indi-
cators in order to further enhance the accumulation of knowledge and to in-
crease the relevance of social studies of quantification. The concept of key 
indicators is geared towards stimulating systematic comparisons between insti-
tutionalisation processes of indicators with similar and diverging trajectories. 
Third, as a heuristic for analysing how indicators are employed in social power 
struggles to create credible accounts of future developments, we suggested 
paying closer attention to three dimensions of meaning (factual, social, tem-
poral) because we assume this heuristic to be a fruitful starting point for nu-
anced accounts of the dynamics and consequences of indicator use. Currently it 
seems that future-oriented uses of indicators have gained momentum, high-
lighting the contingency of the future while at the same time working towards 
the coordination of collective expectations. Yet, it is still unclear whether the 
growing futurity of indicators will increase the volatility of reflexive expecta-
tions, rendering society more prone to crises. Or, alternatively, whether the use 
of retrospective indicators and the institutionalised programmes tied to them 
can compensate for the risks of risk communication.  
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